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ABSTRACT
Reliable on-off control of peripherals on smart devices is a key to
security and privacy in many scenarios. Journalists want to reliably
turn off radios to protect their sources during investigative report-
ing. Users wish to ensure cameras and microphones are reliably
off during private meetings. In this paper, we present SeCloak, an
ARM TrustZone-based solution that ensures reliable on-off control
of peripherals even when the platform software is compromised.
We design a secure kernel that co-exists with software running on
mobile devices (e.g., Android and Linux) without requiring any code
modifications. An Android prototype demonstrates that mobile pe-
ripherals like radios, cameras, and microphones can be controlled
reliably with a very small trusted computing base and with minimal
performance overhead.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Mobile platform security; Privacy
protections;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Personal smart devices are now central to communication, pro-
ductivity, health, and education habits of their owners. Whether
they are carried in a purse or pocket, or worn on a wrist, these
devices form a hub for location, activities, social encounters, and
even health status. As more people incorporate these devices in to
their daily lives, more personal data resides in these devices.
With the increasing reach of these devices has emerged new
classes of attacks on personal privacy in the form of data breaches
from malicious apps and OS compromises. Data available to these
devices are often of a highly sensitive nature, including biomet-
rics [64], health information [28, 46], user location and unique
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device ID [21, 25, 26], user activity [11, 38] including conversa-
tions [50] and video [17], all of which have been subject of attacks
and leaks. Beyond explicitly gathered data, the sensors on these
devices can often be configured or coaxed into providing sensi-
tive information such as user conversation, location, and activity
beyond their original design [42, 43, 51, 59]. The fact that such
attacks are now common is not surprising: as vendors add more
functionality, the software base that, often, must be trusted has
grown to millions of lines of code, and the data that can be stolen
is highly lucrative. As a result, there is a perceived loss of trust in
these devices: sophisticated (and increasingly regular) users are no
longer certain exactly what their device is monitoring or what data
is being gathered. Worse, there are many situations when the loss
of privacy translates to loss of security (or worse), and these users
need unambiguous and reliable methods to control their devices.
Currently, the only fully reliable control is to remove the battery if
possible (or place the device in a Faraday cage.)
At the same time however, these devices have highly sophis-
ticated hardware security built into their architecture, which is
commonly used to store biometric information and for financial
transactions. In this paper, we address the following question:
What is minimally required atop existing hardware
primitives to give users secure and direct control over
the sensors and radios in their devices, without af-
fecting the functionality of the rest of the device, or
changing the installed large software base?
The system we present, SeCloak, short for “Secure Cloak” would
allow users to, for example, verifiably1 turn off all radios (e.g., WiFi,
Bluetooth, cellular) and sensors (e.g., GPS, microphone), using hard-
ware mechanisms. This guarantee would hold even if apps were
malicious, the framework (e.g., Android) was buggy, or the kernel
(e.g., Linux) was compromised.
An independent layer addresses an important part of the general
security and privacy problem by enabling users to reliably control
the availability of certain I/O devices, regardless of the state of
vendor or third-party supplied software (in our prototype: apps,
Android, and Linux). It is easy to make the case for SeCloak with
regards to privacy: SeCloak can be used to reliably turn off recording
devices such as cameras, microphones, and other sensors whenever
users require such privacy; users would continue to be able to
use the rest of the functionality of their device. There are other
1“Verifiably” in our context does not refer to a formal proof of correctness, but to the
fact that the secure software can (1) unambiguously notify users of the state of the
hardware, and (2) allow users to reliably control the hardware state of their device.
We believe the small size of our TCB makes it (more) amenable to formal analysis, but
such verification is out of scope for this paper.
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situations where SeCloak is useful that is perhaps evenmore critical:
for example, SeCloak would enable a journalist to reliably place
their phone into a mode where their physical whereabouts cannot
be traced. Given the importance and ubiquity of mobile devices,
we believe that a capability such as SeCloak, which enables secure
and robust control over hardware, is not simply an option but a
necessity in many use cases.
SeCloak is built using the ARM TrustZone hardware security
extension. In order, our design goals are to:
(1) Allow users to securely and verifiably control peripherals
on their device
(2) Maintain system usability and stability
(3) Minimize the trusted code base
(4) Not change existing software including the apps, frameworks
or OS kernels
As we will explain later, TrustZone provides extensive support
for running individual CPU cores in “secure” and “non-secure”
modes, and allows for dynamic partitioning of the hardware into se-
cure and non-secure components. An isolated trusted OS kernel can
run in secure mode, and control all memory/peripheral accesses and
interrupts received by the non-secure kernel. The facilities provided
by TrustZone makes satisfying (1) and (3) relatively trivial. How-
ever, since the non-secure software (in our case: Linux, Android,
and all apps) are not written for such dynamic system partitioning,
satisfying (1)-(4) simultaneously is surprisingly difficult.
The primary contribution of this paper is the design and imple-
mentation of an end-to-end system that (nearly) satisfies all four of
our stated goals. SeCloak employs a small custom kernel, called the
s-kernel, to securely place the device in a user-approved state. The
s-kernel traps and emulates load and store operations to protected
devices by the untrusted Android platform to enforce the user’s
policy with a very small trusted computing base.
Users can set preferences using an untrusted Android app. These
preferences are conveyed to the s-kernel by the app, and then
confirmed by the user to the s-kernel directly . Beyond control of
individual devices, the app identifies different modes of operation
(e.g., Airplane mode that turns off all transmitters) for convenience.
Even with parts of the hardware not available to the non-secure ker-
nel, Android remains usable, and the device performs as expected.
While the app itself is rudimentary, we believe our proof-of-concept
demonstrates that goals (1) and (2) can be simultaneously satisfied.
The entire s-kernel, including secure device initialization, setting
device state per user preference, user interaction for confirmation,
and instruction emulation, is only 15k lines of code. (In compari-
son, the Linux kernel is roughly 13m lines of code.) We believe our
s-kernel TCB size satisfies the third goal. Finally, SeCloak requires
1 source line to be changed in the Linux kernel (the change can be
applied directly to the kernel binary if the source is not available),
introduces a new kernel module (for calls into the s-kernel), and
no change whatsoever to other software layers, including Android.
Thus, we get very close to satisfying the last goal of not having to
change existing software.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We cover related
work and background in ARM TrustZone in Section 2 and describe
the design of the s-kernel in Section 3.We describe our secure kernel
in Section 4 and non-secure software in Section 5. We present an
evaluation of SeCloak in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Motivated by the security and privacy problems in mobile de-
vices, recent work envisions many different solutions for malicious
apps, including novel permission models [8, 19, 47, 61, 65–67] and
sandboxing [7, 9, 48, 55]. Reference monitors and security ker-
nels [2, 15, 24, 32, 39, 45, 53, 63] provide fine-grained access-control
mechanisms that can contain application misbehavior. However,
these solutions assume that the kernel itself is not compromised. To
address problems with compromised or malicious kernels, we have
to consider approaches that use hardware-based containment of pe-
ripherals. Hence, in this section, we focus on hardware techniques
that can be used to implement an isolated software component that
controls peripherals.
Peripherals can be isolated from a platform OS using virtual-
ization extensions [12, 14] or hardware security extensions [5, 14,
27, 30, 35]. We discuss a subset of such prior works, specifically
focusing on secure peripheral control.
Controlling peripherals via Virtualization. One approach is to
run the platform OS as a guest within a virtual machine, leaving a
hypervisor in control of peripheral devices. Existing work uses hy-
pervisors to isolate applications from untrusted OSs [12, 29, 33, 40],
protect integrity and confidentiality of the application memory and
provide support for managing cryptographic keys. Beyond mem-
ory integrity, Inktag [29] and Sego [33] provide trusted access to
the filesystem. These systems are designed for isolating individual
applications from the OS, but don’t provide a mechanism to reliably
control generic peripherals like SeCloak.
Zhou et al. [68, 69] propose trusted path schemes using a hyper-
visor to host the untrusted OS and all trusted program endpoints
(PEs) of applications in separate VMs, with the PEs supplying all of
the necessary device drivers. DriverGuard [13] protects I/O data
flows by using a hypervisor to ensure that only privileged code
blocks (PCBs) can operate on the raw, unencrypted I/O data. BitVi-
sor [58] is a hypervisor that implements “para-virtualization” for
enforcing security on I/O control and data. SGXIO [62] posits a
system in which a hypervisor hosts the untrusted OS (running in a
VM) as well as the trusted I/O drivers (running in Intel SGX [30]
enclaves). Lacuna [20] ensures that I/O flows can be securely erased
from memory once they terminate, by relying on virtualization,
encryption, and direct NIC access.
These approaches seek to protect the integrity and confidentiality
of I/O data paths while maintaining full functionality, which comes
at the expense of a large TCB. SeCloak, on the other hand, provides
reliable on/off control of smart device peripherals based on a very
small TCB.
Hardware Security Extensions. Beyond virtualization, modern
architectures offer trusted hardware components e.g., Intel SGX [30]
and ARM TrustZone [5], which can be used to isolate software
components from an untrusted platform OS. These techniques go
beyond Trusted PlatformModules (TPM), which enable secure boot,
or Intel Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT) [31] and AMD Secure
VirtualMachine (SVM) [1], which allow for attested execution of the
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OS or smaller code segments [41]. Of particular interest to mobile
smart devices is TrustZone, because ARM is the dominant CPU
architecture in this market and TrustZone supports the isolation of
peripheral device access.
ARM TrustZone [5] is a set of hardware security extensions
that supports isolation of two “worlds” of execution: non-secure
and secure. TrustZone differs from SGX in two important ways:
TrustZone does not address hardware memory attacks (i.e., it does
not encrypt the secure world’s RAM), and unlike SGX, TrustZone
addresses peripheral device security as described next.
Each processor core executes in the context of a single world at
any time; a core can “switch” worlds using a privileged instruction
(and, if configured, upon exceptions or interrupts). All accesses to
memory and I/O devices are tagged with an additional bit, the ’NS’
bit, which specifies whether the access was issued while the core
was in non-secure mode. Components in the system (e.g., bus and
memory controllers) can be configured, in hardware, to only allow
secure accesses.
By default, TrustZone supports a single isolated execution en-
vironment (the secure world), with a secure boot process that can
be used to verify the bootloader and the secure-world kernel. Ko-
modo [23] provably extends TrustZone to support attested isolated
execution environments similar to Intel SGX enclaves (though phys-
ical memory snooping remains out of scope.) Cho et al. [14] explore
a hybrid approach to supporting isolated execution environments
with both a hypervisor and ARM TrustZone. During the lifetime
of a secure application, the hypervisor is active and provides iso-
lation; otherwise, the hypervisor is disabled (reducing overhead)
and TrustZone hardware protections are used to protect sensitive
memory regions. Neither of these systems address peripheral access
control.
Controlling peripherals using TrustZone. Prior work has built
trusted path using TrustZone, withmuch focus on balancing the size
of the secure TCB versus functionality. For instance, TrustUI [34]
enables trusted paths without trusting device drivers by splitting
drivers into an untrusted backend and trusted frontend that runs
within the secure kernel. TrustUI uses ad-hoc techniques, such as
randomizing keys on the on-screen keyboard after every touch, for
ensuring that the information available to the non-secure kernel
does not leak device data. ShrodinText [3] is a system for displaying
text while preserving its confidentiality from the untrusted OS.
ShrodinText establishes a secure path between a remote (trusted)
server and the local framebuffer/display for this purpose, relying
on TrustZone and a hypervisor (for MMU and IOMMUs) to secure
parts of the rendering stack. Liu et al. [36] uses trusted device and
bus drivers, implemented in TrustZone and hypervisors, to attest
and encrypt sensor readings. SeCloak instead focuses on reliable
on/off control of peripherals on mobile platforms with a very small
TCB.
TrustZone is the basis for commercial products [35, 54, 56, 60]
that implement support for isolated execution of secure applications
and for secure IO. Many of these systems provide specific applica-
tions for secure data input (e.g., PIN and fingerprint input, biometric
identification) [54, 60]. Unlike SeCloak, these systems provide no
device configuration controls. OP-TEE [35] is a small TCB OS for
implementing secure applications over TrustZone. Our prototype
SeCloak is built on a much pared-down version of OP-TEE.
Brasser et al. [10] enable on/off control of peripheral devices that
are in restricted spaces (e.g., where the use of the camera is not
allowed). The system relies on a local, TrustZone-isolated policy
enforcement service that grants a remote policy server read/write
access to system memory. To protect against rogue accesses, the
user relies on a separate vetting server that determines whether to
allow or deny each of the policy server’s memory access requests.
The policy server uses this remote memory access capability to
query the state of the platform OS and modify the OS’s device
configuration according to the desired policy. The policy server
must be able to handle any platform OS version, configuration,
and state, which increases its TCB and requisite maintenance over
time. Also, the policy server cannot tolerate any vulnerability in
the platform OS that is not known to the policy server (e.g., zero-
day exploits), and must periodically re-check the state to ensure
continued compliance. Like this work, SeCloak provides reliable
on/off control of peripheral devices; however, it does so under a
stronger threat model that includes a compromised platform OS.
Additionally, SeCloak has a smaller TCB as it does not depend on
any details of the platform OS in order to meet the requisite security
properties.
Santos et al. [16, 57] present “trust leases”, which allow applica-
tions to request (with user approval) leases to place the device in a
restricted mode until some terminal condition is met (e.g., after 4
hours). The trust lease model could be used to implement a settings
application that allows the users on/off control over peripheral
I/O devices. Their threat model assumes that the platform OS is
trusted and correct; their prototype implementation lives inside the
Android framework and Linux kernel. In contrast, SeCloak has a
stronger threat model that includes a malicious platform OS, and
operates as a separate, minimal secure kernel that runs alongside
the existing platform OS.
PROTC [37] is a system for safeguarding flight control systems
on drones from non-essential but malicious software. PROTC runs
applications in the TrustZone non-secure world, and a kernel with
access to protected peripherals in secure word. PROTC’s secure ker-
nel communicates with ground control using an encrypted channel.
Compared to SeCloak, PROTC is designed for a different application
domain, and does not allow for dynamic modification of protected
peripherals. Untrusted applications are always isolated, and the
secure kernel contains all of the protected device drivers.
Viola [44] enables custom, per-peripheral notifications whenever
the I/O peripheral device is being used; for example, blinking the
notification LED when the camera is active. Viola employs formal
verification techniques to provide guarantees that the user will be
notified. SeCloak and Viola are complementary: the user could use
SeCloak to disable devices and rely on Viola to notify them when
specific enabled devices are in use.
3 DESIGN OVERVIEW
As we have described, many prior approaches have ported (parts
of) device drivers into a secure kernel to provide robust access
to peripherals, and for limiting the access given to the NS-kernel.
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Figure 1: High-level overview of SoC architecture, focusing
on the security components that SeCloak relies on.
However, none of them satisfy the goals of SeCloak. Our work de-
parts from these systems in two major ways: we do not modify the
NS-kernel— the NS-kernel device drivers, interfaces, etc. remain
completely unchanged. Next, our secure kernel TCB is extremely
small (see Section 6.1). Since the s-kernel we describe here focuses
entirely on providing the SeCloak functionality (as opposed to more
general secure device access or control), we do not require large
device drivers or complicated mechanisms within the s-kernel. In
fact, the bulk of the functionality provided by the s-kernel relies on
instruction trapping and emulation of ARM load and store instruc-
tions to enable selective access to peripherals.
Figure 1 shows a schematic of the ARM TrustZone architecture
(and associated hardware components provided by the SoC we use
to implement SeCloak). Recall that the TrustZone security model
posits that the CPU can be in a “Non-Secure” (NS) mode or “Secure”
mode, and all memory and bus accesses are tagged with the CPU
mode using an extra “NS-bit” bus line. (There are, in fact, many dif-
ferent privileged modes the processor can be in, including a secure
“monitor” mode that we use extensively.) Different peripherals, in-
cluding parts of RAM, IO devices and interrupts, can be configured
to be available only in Secure mode. In our design, Linux runs as
the NS-kernel, and SeCloak (with its secure kernel) controls the
secure modes of the CPU 2 .
The ARM Security Configuration Register (SCR) contains the
“NS” bit that describes whether the core executing code is in the non-
secure or secure mode. The SCR also contains a bit that determines
whether a hardware exceptions not raised by the CPU (so called
“external aborts” in ARM, e.g., a data abort raised from a memory
access) cause the processor to switch to the securemonitormode. As
we shall see, it is this setting of the SCR that enables SeCloak to trap
and emulate instructions issued by the Linux kernel. The SCR also
contains similar configuration bits for interrupts, which SeCloak
uses to listen for user input and support secure system reboot. ARM
supports two types of interrupts: IRQs and FIQs. Traditionally, the
secure world exclusively uses FIQs and the non-secure world uses
IRQs; therefore, the SCR is set to trap FIQs to the secure monitor
mode.
ARM provides a TrustZone Address Space Controller (TZASC)
that can partition portions of RAM such that they are available only
to secure mode accesses, enabling isolation of the s-kernel memory
from Linux.
2Note that it is also possible to implement SeCloak on top of hardware virtualization
mechanisms (i.e., nested page tables and IOMMUs).
Our SeCloak prototype is built using a i.MX6 SoC. i.MX pro-
vides a TrustZone compatible component, the Central Security Unit
(CSU), that extends the secure/non-secure access distinction to pe-
ripherals. The CSU can be used to enable secure-only access for
different peripherals (which SeCloak uses), and also for program-
ming access to various bus DMA masters (e.g., the GPU). The CSU
contains a set of registers, called the “Config Security Level” (CSL)
registers, which can be set to mandate secure-only access to var-
ious peripherals, e.g., GPIO controllers, PWM devices, etc. While
our implementation programs the i.MX-specific CSU, the design
is general, and can be ported to other SoCs which provide similar
functionality.
In Figure 1, we encapsulate the TZASC and CSU as a virtual
“firewall” on the control path to RAM and devices. In hardware
implementation, these components are not necessarily on the con-
trol bus or the bus path, but may further program other hardware
components that control access. For our purposes and for SeCloak
software, this logical view of an intercepting firewall is sufficient
(and accurate).
SeCloak uses a purpose-built kernel (the s-kernel) that runs
in TrustZone secure mode. The s-kernel programs each of these
components (the SCR, the TZASC, the CSU) as required, both at
initialization and runtime to enable SeCloak. We next discuss a
user’s typical workflow with SeCloak before describing how the
s-kernel is configured to enable SeCloak.
3.1 Threat Model
We assume that the device hardware is not malicious, and that
the state of the hardware (number and type of IO devices, their
physical addresses and buses, interrupts, etc.) is encapsulated in a
“device tree” file that is signed by a trusted source, as explained later
in Section 4.1. (The hardware on modern embedded- and small-
devices is usually described in such a device tree, and existing
kernels already provide library routines to parse this format.)
Beyond the hardware, we assume that the boot ROM and boot-
loader is trusted and correctly loads the s-kernel. The s-kernel is
also trusted and assumed correct.
All other software in the system may be faulty or malicious. This
includes any app the user may run, any framework layer (such as
Android), any kernel modules, and the NS-kernel itself.
3.2 SeCloak Workflow
Figure 2 shows the SeCloak workflow. Users interact with a regular
Android app (leftmost screenshot), and choose On or Off settings for
various IO devices and peripherals. This app is similar to the “Set-
tings” apps that are already available on smartphones and tablets.
An implicit assumption is that users understand which periph-
erals should be turned off (or on) under different circumstances.
Towards this end, the SeCloak app helps users by providing pre-
defined operating modes (e.g. Airplane mode or Stealth mode) and
associated settings for the appropriate groups of peripherals. As
we shall see next, SeCloak ensures that for any mode or sets of in-
dividual devices that the user chooses in this step, the user receives
an unambiguous confirmation of their state.
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Figure 2: Overview of the SeCloak workflow. The first panel (leftmost) shows a screenshot of the non-secure Android app. The
second panel shows the steps taken after the user pushes the button to apply the settings. The third panel shows a photograph
of the secure SeCloak app, which (re-)displays the settings to the user and waits for user confirmation. (Screenshots are not
possible in secure mode.) The fourth panel shows the steps taken if the user confirms the settings, such as disabling/enabling
devices and returning control back to the non-secure world (and app).
Once the user chooses “Set Preferences?”, the app uses a Linux
device driver to invoke a cross-kernel call, called a SMC call in Trust-
Zone (second panel from left in Figure 2). The argument to this call
encodes the user’s preferences. The s-kernel receives these prefer-
ences as part of the SMC call handler. Note that malicious software
(the app, system services, the NS-kernel) could have changed the
preferences prior to the SMC call!
User preferences, possibly modified, are received within the
s-kernel as part of the SMC call. At this point, the s-kernel takes
exclusive access of the framebuffer and hardware buttons. The s-
kernel parses the preferences, and recreates an image that exactly
corresponds to the settings chosen by the user, and copies this
images to the framebuffer. If the preferences had been modified,
the image on the framebuffer would not correspond to the settings
chosen by the user, and the user would notice a setting that does not
correspond to their choice. The user is thus notified of malicious
software on their device.
The s-kernel changes the “Set Preferences?” button to one that
allows the user to confirm the settings by pressing a hard button
(the “Home” button), or to go back (using the Back key) to the
app and continue changing settings. We show a photograph of
this screen (with a red secure confirm button) in the third panel of
Figure 2.
A malicious app could display the preferences screen and then
spoof the confirmation screen. It is imperative that during the
confirmation phase, the user is unambiguously notified that she is
interacting with the s-kernel. Thus, during this phase, the s-kernel
lights a protected LEDwhich ensures the user that she is interacting
with the s-kernel. This LED is never accessible to the NS-kernel.
Assuming the settings were as the user intended, she may con-
firm the settings by pressing the “Home” button. The s-kernel dis-
ables (or enables) various IO devices and peripherals as instructed
(rightmost panel in Figure 2).
4 SECLOAK SECURE KERNEL
We describe SeCloak’s secure kernel, called the s-kernel, in this
section. A signed device tree describes available hardware and
protections to the s-kernel. Prior to describing the kernel itself, we
discuss how it is securely booted (next), and the device tree.
Modern devices are equipped with secure, tamper-proof, non-
volatile storage, into which device manufacturers embed (hashes
of) public keys. The devices contain a one-time programmable Boot
ROM that has access to these keys, which are “fused” onto the
hardware.
In bootstrapping SeCloak, we assume that a trusted principal
(either the hardware manufacturer or the user) has performed the
following steps:
• Generated a trusted key, and stored the key onto the tamper-
proof non-volatile storage. For convenience, modern devices
often allow multiple such keys to be “fused” onto the hard-
ware; once installed, these cannot be removed or modified
by software.
• Program the boot ROM to load a signed bootloader image.
The boot ROM verifies the signature against the fused key(s)
and then executes the bootloader if successful.
• The bootloader (U-Boot [22] in our case) contains a set of
public keys which it uses to verify signatures on all loaded
images. The bootloader will locate and load a signed s-kernel
image and signed device tree blob (explained next). After
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Figure 3: Visualization of the device tree with a correspond-
ing excerpt from the device tree file for the Boundary De-
vices Nitrogen6Q SoC. The labeled nodes correspond to par-
ents and dependencies of the “ft5x06_ts” touchscreen de-
vice.
verifying the signatures, the bootloader will execute the s-
kernel. Modern bootloaders already support such verified
booting.
4.1 Device Tree
The device tree structure [18] describes the hardware devices present
in a given system and how they are interconnected, with each node
representing an individual device. It is important to note that the
device tree, by our assumptions, must be an accurate and complete
description of the hardware. Otherwise, there may be other periph-
erals in the system that can completely violate any and all security
properties, since the s-kernel would not know of their existence,
and would not be able to control the NS-kernel’s access to these
“rogue” peripherals.
Figure 3 shows an excerpt from the device tree of our proto-
type board, showing the arrangement of the touchscreen device
(ft5x06_ts), the camera device (ov5642), the image processing unit
(ipu), and one of the gpio controllers (gpio1). This a typical arrange-
ment of buses and devices on a modern SoC: for example, we see
that the touchscreen device and the camera are attached to I2C
buses, which themselves are slaves of the AIPS (AHB-to-IP-Bridge)
which is a hardware bridge between the system bus and third-party
IP blocks such as the I2C controllers.
Each node has named properties along with a set of child nodes;
some properties might also express non-parental dependencies on
other devices in the system (e.g., touchscreen relying on GPIO pin
for interrupts). Some devices, such as buses, clocks, and interrupt
controllers, have required properties that denote how their children
(for buses) or dependents (for clocks and interrupt controllers) can
reference their resources.
In addition to the standard device tree, we add several properties
to device nodes. First, we add a “class” property that maps low-level
components (such as interrupts and pins) to user-understandable
names, such as “microphone”, “WiFi”, etc. These class strings corre-
spond to individual devices that can be controlled via SeCloak.
Second, we add a “protect” property that identifies hardware pro-
tection bits that must be set to protect the device. On our prototype,
these map devices to their associated CSU registers.
4.2 SeCloak Kernel
Upon boot, the s-kernel initializes hardware defaults prior to launch-
ing the NS-kernel. Specific steps include setting control and security
registers to appropriate defaults, and setting memory protections
such that the NS-kernel cannot overwrite the s-kernel’s state.
The s-kernel initializes its internal data structures by initializing
the system MMU with virtual memory page table mappings for
various regions, including regions for non-secure RAM, s-kernel
heap, and for MMIO devices. The s-kernel also starts the non-boot
CPUs, and initializes per-core threads and their contexts. Faults
and calls from the NS-kernel transition the CPU into a monitor
mode, and the s-kernel initializes the secure monitor with its stack
pointer and call vector. Finally, the s-kernel opens and parses the
device tree.
4.2.1 s-kernel Device Drivers. The s-kernel itself contains min-
imal drivers for three devices: GIC (generic interrupt controller),
GPIO controller, and the framebuffer. The GIC driver isolates inter-
rupts that can be received by the NS-kernel, the GPIO controller
allows the s-kernel to directly interact with hardware buttons, and
the framebuffer driver allows the s-kernel to render the confirma-
tion screen. Together, they enable the secure part of SeCloak. We
explain these drivers next.
GIC Driver. The Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC) chip handles
the distribution of interrupts to CPU cores and enables isolated
control and handling of non-secure and secure interrupts. The
s-kernel GIC driver supports functions to (1) enable or disable
specific interrupts, (2) set cpu mask and interrupt priority, (3) assign
interrupts to security groups, and (4) registering interrupt handlers.
These functions allow isolating interrupts associated with specific
devices to be either completely disabled or to be delivered to the s-
kernel. The s-kernel can receive hardware interrupts and optionally
re-deliver them to the NS-kernel; for example, this functionality is
used by the GPIO and GPIO keys drivers that we describe next.
GPIODriver. The general-purpose input-output (GPIO) controller
supports input and output operations on individual hardware pins.
In addition, the GPIO controller can also act as an interrupt con-
troller on a per-pin basis. When an interrupt condition is triggered
for a pin, the GPIO controller triggers a (chained) interrupt which
is handled by the GIC.
The s-kernel GPIO driver supports acquiring/releasing pins for
exclusive s-kernel use, registering an interrupt handler for a given
pin, and reading (or writing) values from (or to) a pin. The GPIO
driver relies on the GIC driver to register its own interrupt handler,
which (when invoked) will read the GPIO device state in order to
determine which pins raised the interrupt, and then invoke han-
dlers corresponding to these pins. The driver protects and emulates
accesses to the GPIO controllers in order to allow the non-secure
world to continue to use any non-acquired pins while preventing it
from inferring any information about the acquired (secured) pins.
Building on the GPIO driver, the GPIO keys driver supports
hardware buttons/keys connected to GPIO pins (e.g., power and
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volume buttons). The GPIO keys handler translates hardware button
presses into a key code that is specified in the device tree (e.g.,
KEY_BACK) and passes it on to any s-kernel listeners. The listeners
can choose to consume the key press or allow it to be passed back
to the non-secure world. We use the GPIO keys driver to register
listeners for a secure shutdown sequence (see Section 5.2), and also
for the cloak application to wait for the user to confirm or deny the
displayed settings.
Framebuffer Driver. The s-kernel framebuffer driver uses the
image processing unit (IPU) device to display images. When the
s-kernel application acquires the framebuffer, the driver allocates
a single buffer in the secure region of memory and sets the buffer
format (RGB24) in the IPU. Additionally, the driver protects access
to the IPU and emulates accesses in order to prevent the non-secure
world from overwriting the settings (see Section 4.6.1 for emulation
policy details). When the s-kernel application releases the frame-
buffer, the driver restores the previous settings of the non-secure
world and unprotects the IPU. Additionally, the framebuffer driver
provides helper functions for clearing the buffer with a single color
and for blitting images onto the display at specified locations. We
rely on the framebuffer driver for (re-)displaying the settings in
the SeCloak app. The images displayed by the s-kernel framebuffer
driver cannot be modified by the NS-kernel.
4.3 SMC Handlers
The s-kernel supports two SMC calls, CLOAK_SET and CLOAK_GET,
from the NS-kernel to enable SeCloak.
The NS-kernel invokes the CLOAK_SET call with a bitvector as
the argument. Individual bits in the bitvector correspond to the
settings for different device classes. The bitvector contains “special”
bits that encode modes (e.g., Airplane, Movie, Stealth), and groups
(e.g., Networking) as displayed by the app.
The CLOAK_SET handler executes the following steps:
• It starts by acquiring the framebuffer and GPIO keypad (via
GPIO). As described in Section 4.2.1, acquiring devices ap-
plies necessary hardware protection settings, emulation pol-
icy, and initial settings for the secure use of the device.
• The CLOAK_SET handler parses the bitvector and checks to
see if it is valid; if so, it uses framebuffer driver routines to blit
corresponding images to the screen in order to (re-)display
the settings to the user.
• Next, the notification LED, which is persistently acquired
for exclusive use by the s-kernel, is turned on by the handler
(via GPIO) to notify the user that the s-kernel is in control.
• The CLOAK_SET handler then waits for the user to confirm
(via the ‘Home’ button) or deny (via the ‘Back’ button) the
settings via its registered GPIO keypad listener. If the user
confirms the settings, the handler will issue calls to enable
or disable each device class; otherwise, if the user denies the
settings, the handler does not take any action.
• Finally, the handler releases the acquired devices (which
resets per-device state as necessary, e.g., framebuffer format-
ting and addresses) and returns.
In order to disable (or re-enable) a device class, the CLOAK_SET
handler first identifies all devices that belong to the given class (as
described in the device tree). For each of those devices, the han-
dler locates any “protect” properties, which identify the hardware
protection that must be set to isolate the device. In some cases, the
device itself may not have hardware protection, but the bus it is
located on may. Thus, the code must search for possible hardware
isolation not just at the device node, but recursively up the device
tree as well. In this way, the s-kernel applies the hardware isolation
for each device as described in the device tree.
The NS-kernel can use the CLOAK_GET call to receive a bitvector
that encodes the current protection state of device classes (and
which mode is active or which groups are enabled or disabled).
Upon launch, the non-secure Android app uses this call to render
an initial setting.
4.4 Non-Secure and Secure Device Sharing
We rely on the ability to share devices between the non-secure and
secure worlds, such as for providing a secure shutdown sequence
via the GPIO keypad (e.g., power and volume buttons) while still
allowing the non-secure world to handle button presses. Two un-
derlying mechanisms enable such sharing: 1) interrupt (re-)delivery
to the non-secure world, and 2) emulation policy to control the
non-secure view of the device. While explaining the mechanisms,
we will focus on the example of the GPIO controller. The GPIO
controller uses a GIC interrupt in order to signal that the interrupt
condition is met for one (or more) pins.
In order to share interrupts with the non-secure world, we mod-
ify the device tree such that the s-kernel operates on the actual
hardware interrupt line of the device that is connected to the GIC,
while the NS-kernel operates on a (previously unused) interrupt
line. When the s-kernel receives an interrupt that should be shared,
it sets the corresponding non-secure world interrupt line pending
via the GIC.
4.5 DMA
Devices that are DMA masters can issue memory accesses on the
system bus. For example, the Image Processing Unit (IPU) will
perform periodic DMA transfers to read from framebuffers (whose
addresses are specified in the IPU’s registers). Each DMAmaster has
permissions assigned for its bus accesses (i.e., non-secure or secure),
which (on our platform) are configured in the CSU registers. In order
to prevent the DMA masters from reading (or even modifying) the
s-kernel memory, we must configure their accesses as non-secure.
However, this presents a problem for the IPU device: since we
need to present a secure framebuffer to the screen, it must be able
to perform DMA accesses to secure memory regions. To address
this, we use the TZASC to configure the region that contains the
framebuffer as non-secure read and secure read/write. While this
lets the NS-kernel inspect the secure framebuffer, we do not require
confidentiality of this framebuffer for any of our security goals
(only the integrity of its contents).
4.6 Instruction Faults and Emulation
The s-kernel configures TrustZone such that accesses by the NS-
kernel to memory regions that belong to protected devices cause
a fault. This fault is trapped by the monitor mode handler of the
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s-kernel. We need these traps to be able to selectively allow or deny
NS-kernel accesses to devices.
For a rudimentary SeCloak app, it is sufficient to simply configure
TrustZone protections, and ignore these faults. However, such a
solution is unworkable if we want the device to remain usable,
as per our original goals, when specific peripherals are protected.
In general, the s-kernel has to trap the faulting instructions, and
selectively emulate them based on hardware state as we describe
in this section.
There are two main reasons to intercept non-secure accesses
to protected resources and emulate these accesses in the secure
world. First, there can be a mismatch between the granularity of
hardware protection and that of individual devices that are being
protected. For instance, on the i.MX 6 [49], the Central Security
Unit (CSU) contains Config Security Level (CSL) registers that re-
strict access to peripheral devices according to whether the accesses
are made by the non-secure or secure world. These CSL registers
group multiple devices into a single register (e.g., GPIO1 & GPIO2
or PWM1 through PWM4). If we want to disable a single (or subset of)
devices, we must allow accesses to all others that are protected by
the CSL group. Dependencies in the device tree can also cause mis-
matches in hardware–software protection granularity. For example,
the ft5x06_ts touchscreen uses a GPIO pin to signal an interrupt
to the processor when the user is touching the screen; in order to
secure the touchscreen, we must also secure the individual GPIO
pin, but not all the 64 pins that are protected by the corresponding
CSL register.
Second, we can use emulation for efficiently acquiring devices
for (temporary) exclusive use by secure applications, as well as
to share devices between the secure and non-secure worlds. This
can reduce the trusted codebase in the s-kernel, e.g., by allowing
NS-kernel writes to the device for non-critical accesses. We use this
technique to reduce the driver code size for the framebuffer driver.
4.6.1 Instruction Emulation: Detail. Each access to a device ulti-
mately performs a memory-mapped Input/Output (MMIO) read or
write operation to a region of memory associated with the device.
(The mapping of memory region to device is obtained from the de-
vice tree.) When hardware protections are enabled for a particular
device, MMIO accesses produce data abort exceptions; these are
traditionally handled by the NS-kernel.
Hardware setup. In order to intercept these accesses, s-kernel sets
up the Secure Configuration Register (SCR) in the CPU to specify
that all external aborts should be handled by the monitor. This
setting causes data aborts to signal a fault that transitions the CPU
into the secure monitor mode. The faulting address and related
information is available to the monitor fault handler.
In the s-kernel, the securemonitor fault handler invokes a routine
that determines whether to emulate or deny the access and, if
emulated, whether to modify the value being read or written. The
s-kernel maintains a data structure that contains regions of memory
(physical base address and size) corresponding to different devices,
along with the prevailing policy for each.
The policy associated with each region may choose to deny a
read or write. If a read is allowed, the value that is read can be
modified prior to being returned to the NS-kernel. If a write is
allowed, the value to be written can be modified prior to the write.
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Figure 4: Components and steps involved in intercepting
and emulating accesses made by the non-secure world.
The s-kernel code decodes the instruction that cause the original
fault: these instructions are of the form ldr (load register for reads)
or str (store register for writes). By default, the s-kernel emulates
the instruction exactly and returns control back to the NS-kernel.
NS-kernel Execution. Figure 4 shows this process. Here a non-
secure driver attempts to read from a device (“Dev 1”) that is dis-
abled by SeCloak. Specifically, the NS-kernel code issues a LDR R0,
[R1] instruction to load from the address pointed to by R1 into R0.
The R1 register contains a memory address that belongs to “Dev 1”.
Upon executing this instruction (1), the CPU issues a read on
the system bus (2). This memory read is intercepted by the hard-
ware firewall (CSU/TZASC) responsible for protecting “Dev 1”. The
firewall checks to see if the access should be allowed; if not, the
firewall returns a bus error to the CPU (which interprets this as
an external data abort). In this case, since “Dev 1” is disabled by
SeCloak, the firewall will deny the read and report a bus error to
the CPU (3).3 The CPU receives this bus error which corresponds
to an external data abort. Given the SCR configuration, the CPU
switches to monitor mode and invokes the monitor mode’s data
abort handler (4).
The data abort handler saves (and later restores) the current reg-
ister set 4 and preserves the location to return to (i.e., the instruction
following the faulting instruction).
Fault Handling. At this point, the fault handler has to determine
two items: what was the instruction that caused the fault, and what
was the faulting address? By convention, the Data Fault Address
Register (DFAR) contains the virtual address of the access that
caused the fault, and the LR register contains the virtual address
of the instruction that caused the fault. However, these virtual
addresses are non-secure virtual addresses, and the fault handler
uses an ARM co-processor routine to resolve them into physical
addresses (“D_PA” from the DFAR, and “I_PA” from the LR). The
3The system can be configured to also issue an interrupt to the CPU upon such an
error; we do not use this option in our implementation.
4To be precise, some registers in ARM are “banked” (e.g., the link register LR), in that
each mode has its own copy of the register. The abort handler saves the non-banked
registers as well as the LR corresponding to the mode that caused the abort.
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fault handler then passes control to the s-kernel emulation routine
with the saved register context of the non-secure world (called
“Ctx”) and these two addresses as arguments.
The emulation routine (5) begins by translating these physical
addresses to secure-world virtual addresses, and checks to make
sure that they are in appropriate regions: the non-secure RAM for
the instruction and a device MMIO region for the data address. Next,
the emulation routine invokes a custom instruction decoder we
have written to decode the instruction and determine the type of
instruction (whether it is a load or store) and the register involved
in the transfer.
Once the instruction and the physical address is decoded, the
prevailing policy (e.g., deny or allow with modifications) is imple-
mented as described above. In this case, the access is made by a
load instruction, so the emulation first checks to see if the policy
allows the read, performs the IO read operation, and finally checks
to see if the policy wants to modify the result (6). If allowed, the
final result is stored in the NS-context structure (that contains the
non-secure registers).
In order to handle the case where multiple slave devices share a
bus, a bus-specific policy must be provided. The device tree con-
tains resource information that specifies how each device will be
addressed on the bus; for instance, in the case of I2C, this corre-
sponds to the 7-bit slave address assigned to each device. The policy
operates over the accesses to the bus’s MMIO region to determine
which device is being accessed, such that it can deny accesses to
disabled devices (while allowing all others).
NS-kernel resume. The emulation routine then returns control
back to the data abort handler, which restores the registers for the
non-secure world from the NS-context data structure. Note that
for reads, one of these registers may now be updated as a result.
Once the data abort handler terminates, the NS-kernel continues
by executing the instruction directly after the one that caused the
data abort (7).
5 NON-SECURE KERNEL
Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the SeCloak Android app in the
left-most panel. The current version of the app is simple, allowing
users to set ON/OFF preferences for the devices on our prototype
board. Along with individual devices, the app allows users to choose
different operating modes (e.g., Airplane, Stealth) and also provides
the state of groups of peripherals (e.g., all networking devices.)
Once the user presses the “Set Preferences?” button, the app
invokes a JNI call with a bitvector that encodes the user preferences.
The JNI module uses a Linux ioctl call to pass the bitvector to the
SeCloak kernel module which, in turn, issues the SMC call to the
s-kernel with the bitvector as an argument.
5.1 A modification to the NS-kernel
Recall that our design goals were not to modify the NS-kernel or
existing software if at all possible. Unfortunately, without a single
byte modification, as we describe next, we can only provide the
security guarantee, but not maintain system stability.
SeCloak requires that the s-kernel be able to trap individual
accesses to protected devices and selectively emulate these instruc-
tions. However, as normally compiled, a Linux binary on ARM does
not raise data aborts that identify the specific instruction that cause
the abort.
Whether an instruction raises a precise or imprecise abort de-
pends on the page table entry (PTE) attributes of the memory that
the instruction attempts to access. Precise data aborts are triggered
for ldr and str instructions that access “strongly-orderedmemory”.
Strongly ordered memory does not allow accesses to be buffered
by either the processor or bus interconnect [6].
As a result, we must modify Linux such that it configures its
device memory mappings to raise precise aborts. While we do this
step directly in the source, it is a simple change that can, in fact, be
applied on the binary kernel image itself.
In our design, the s-kernel assumes that the NS-kernel is “com-
pliant” in setting device memory to be strongly-ordered. However,
a non-compliant NS-kernel can still not access protected devices. It
will, however, likely not receive any useful service from protected
device groups due to faulty emulation.
Kernel module. The SeCloak app requires a kernel module to
invoke SMC calls, and we have added such a module to Linux. (Later
versions of the Linux/ARM kernels already provide a standard SMC
interface like our kernel module does, though even these kernels
would require a module to export a userspace interface.) The kernel
module provides a ioctl interface, which is used to communicate
the user-selected bitvector to the NS-kernel.
Framework Calls. Along with the single change to the NS-kernel,
the SeCloak app also issues Android calls to address application and
system stability. Note that these are not changes to the framework,
but instead, extra calls that are invoked by the SeCloak app.
When the user elects to disable certain devices, the s-kernel
configures hardware firewall mechanisms to prevent all accesses
to the disabled devices. If the hardware device is attached to the
system bus, then MMIO writes are discarded and reads return 0;
otherwise, if attached to a peripheral bus, then bus access functions
will return an error. Ultimately, device drivers are responsible for
handling these errors, which typically involve several retries before
abort. These errors will further propogate to system services (and
applications) that are attempting to use the device; for example,
when the camera is disabled and the user attempts to run the camera
app, an error message appears after a few seconds.
Within the kernel, power management (PM) routines in device
drivers rely on the ability to communicate with their devices in
order to save relevant state and direct it to enter a low-power mode.
When a device is disabled by the s-kernel, these PM routines will fail
and thus keep the device in a high-power active mode. In adverse
cases, the inability to transition individual devices into low power
states can prevent the entire system from being able to transition to
a low-power state, such as suspend-to-RAM. Second, some device
drivers may not contain appropriate error handling to gracefully
recover from errors resulting from the denied accesses.
Therefore, the SeCloak app makes use of available system ser-
vices (e.g., WifiManager with setWifiEnabled) to disable devices
prior to configuring the hardware firewall mechanisms (and like-
wise enable devices after removing the hardware firewall restric-
tions).
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5.2 Device Reset
After a peripheral has been secured, malicious software inside the
NS-kernel or framework can try to subvert security by rebooting
the entire device. Such a reboot could happen without the user
necessarily noticing (while the device was idle) and could even be
remotely triggered.
One option is to make device policies persistent in the s-kernel,
such that they would be applied whenever the device is booted.
While technically feasible (and indeed quite trivial), this option
affects usability. Upon boot, the NS-kernel (Linux) probes available
devices based on the device tree, and may not set up the device files
and other software correctly if the probe fails (which it would if the
device were secured upon boot.) In turn, parts of the Android frame-
work may not initialize, leaving the device in a unstable/unusable
state. Without a kernel rewrite or support, it is difficult (if not
impossible) to uniformly re-enable devices that were protected at
boot.
Instead, we adopt the following policy: the NS-kernel can reset
the device only if there are no disabled devices. Otherwise, the
s-kernel does not allow the NS-kernel to invoke PSCI [4] calls that
are used to reset the processor.
This design choice has the following implications: first, no code,
including remote exploits, in the NS-kernel can reboot the device if
any peripheral is protected. On the other hand, when the device is
rebooted, the regular NS-kernel probes can proceed as usual, and
the device reboots in a fully usable state. Further, the s-kernel does
not need to keep persistent state about policies, since the device
always reboots with all peripherals accessible to the NS-kernel.
When the NS-kernel needs to reset the device (e.g., after OS or
software updates), the user must first run the SeCloak app and
remove all protections.
The user may, at times, need to reboot the device after protection
has been applied. For instance, the NS-kernel or Android may be-
come unresponsive due to bugs or attacks. To address this scenario,
within the s-kernel, we recognize a hardware key sequence that
the user can input to initiate a reset. Since physical user input is
necessary for the device to be reset, this is a safe option, in that the
user is aware that the device is booting into a unprotected state.
6 EVALUATION
We use the Boundary Devices Nitrogen6Q development board to
run our experiments, which contains an i.MX6 SoC with a quad-
core ARM A9 processor with TrustZone security extensions. We
use Android Nougat 7.1.1 with the Linux kernel version 4.1.15, both
of which are provided by Boundary Devices. The s-kernel imple-
mentation is based on our custom fork of OP-TEE [35]. OP-TEE is a
OS for implementing secure applications over TrustZone; s-kernel
heavily modifies and reduces the OP-TEE codebase. Specifically,
s-kernel retains OP-TEEs kernel threading and debugging support.
s-kernel’s MMU code is also based on OP-TEE. The device drivers
required for SeCloak (e.g., framebuffer and GPIO keypad), device
tree parsing, instruction interception and emulation, and the code
for securing device state was developed specifically for the s-kernel.
We first present results to quantify the size of the TCB, both
in terms of the lines of code as well as the interface exposed to
the NS-kernel. Next, we evaluate the overhead due to intercepting
LOC Breakdown
Type C Src C Hdr ASM Total Stmt
Core 3233 2357 1391 6981 3781
Drivers
CSU 45 9 0 54 29
Device Tree 401 57 0 458 261
Frame Buffer 146 29 0 175 113
GPIO 562 15 0 577 284
GPIO Keypad 169 14 0 183 89
<Other> 579 167 0 746 265
Drivers Total 1902 291 0 2193 1041
Libraries
libfdt 1220 350 0 1570 840
bget/malloc 1421 68 0 1489 797
<Other> 1479 1182 81 2742 1212
Libraries Total 4120 1600 81 5801 2849
Total 9255 4248 1472 14975 7671
Table 1: Breakdown of the lines of code (LOC) for different
parts of our s-kernel implementation. We list the LOC ac-
cording to the language used (and source vs. header) along
with the total LOC. “Stmt” refers to number of statements,
which counts lines in assembly (ASM) and semi-colons in C
source and headers.
and emulating accesses and show that, while there is a fair amount
of overhead for individual instructions, the reduction in overall
system performance is negligible.
6.1 Size of TCB
In Table 1, we show a breakdown of the lines of code for our s-kernel
implementation. “Core” consists of all non-driver and non-library
code in the s-kernel. This code handles core s-kernel functionality,
such as: memory management, threading, the secure monitor, SMC
handling (e.g., PSCI and CLOAK). “Drivers” consists of all driver
code, which is further broken down into specific drivers that we
added to OP-TEE. The “<Other>” category contains pre-existing
drivers, such as the UART (i.e., console), GIC, and TZASC-380
drivers. The “Frame Buffer”, “GPIO”, and “GPIO Keypad” drivers
are smaller than their Linux counterparts since the secure drivers
do not need to support all device functionality.
As listed under “Libraries”, our device tree parsing code relies
on libfdt to extract information from the flattened device tree file
that the bootloader places into RAM. Additionally, the s-kernel
uses the bget and malloc support for dynamic memory allocation.
Finally, there are several other libraries and sets of functions that
are aggregated as “<Other>”, such as: snprintk and trace functions
(for printing debug info), qsort (for sorting memory regions data
structures), and common standard library functions (e.g., memcpy,
strcmp). In general, we could further reduce our reliance on these
libraries but leave this for future work.
In total, our s-kernel comes to just under 15k LOC (∼7.7k state-
ments). The s-kernel has a limited attack surface in terms of the
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Instruction Time (µs)
Execution Load (ldr) Store (str)
Linux 0.11 0.29
Linux+SOM 0.27 0.33
Emulated 1.14 1.19
Table 2: Time to executeARM instructions in the non-secure
world that make device accesses. “Linux” execution uses the
baseline Linux kernel without any changes. “Linux+SOM”
execution uses the baseline Linux kernel but changing the
device memory regions to enforce strong ordering of ac-
cesses. For “Emulated” execution, we configure the s-kernel
to protect access to the WiFi controller and emulate the in-
structions that result in data aborts.
interfaces that the s-kernel provides to the NS-kernel, namely
CLOAK_SET andCLOAK_GET.CLOAK_SET takes one argument, which
is a bit vector containing the modes, groups, and classes that the
user wishes to enable or disable; CLOAK_GET takes no arguments.
6.2 Emulation Overhead
We perform two experiments to analyze the performance overhead
introduced by emulating non-secure instructions that access de-
vices. We focus on the case where the emulation is allowed, such as
when devices are shared between the non-secure and secure world
(e.g., GPIO) or when multiple devices (one of which is disabled)
belong to the same hardware firewall protection group.
In Table 2, we show the time taken to execute a single ARM load
(ldr) or store (str) instruction that access a 32-bit device register
on the WiFi controller. We issued each instruction one million
times to compute the time taken for each individual instruction,
and averaged this time over five trials. We varied the execution
between “Linux”, “Linux+SOM”, and “Emulated” modes. For “Linux”
execution, we use the baseline Linux kernel without any changes,
while for “Linux+SOM” we change the attributes for device memory
regions to enforce strong ordering of memory accesses (required
for interception and emulation, see Section 4.6). For “Emulated”
execution, we configure the s-kernel to protect access to the WiFi
controller via the hardware firewall (i.e., CSU) registers and set the
emulation policy to allow accesses to the WiFi controller’s MMIO
registers.
The requirement of strongly-ordered memory accesses imposes
some overhead as expected, increasing the time taken by 2.45x and
1.14x, respectively. As expected, we see an increase in the time taken
due to trapping and emulating the instructions is 4.22x and 3.61x for
loads and stores respectively. Note that, even though intercepting
and emulating accesses incurs a fair amount of overhead, high-
throughput devices (e.g., camera, network, and display) rely heavily
on DMA transfers for performance and should remain largely un-
affected by emulation overhead (which only affects the control
path for DMA). To that end, we next take a look at a macro-level
benchmark involving the WiFi controller.
Figure 5 show the time taken to transfer files over WiFi when the
controller accesses are emulated vs. not. We used the WiFi Speed
Test [52] application to perform the experiments and log the time
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Figure 5: Time taken for upload and download transfers of
a 10 MB file to complete over WiFi. “Linux”, “Linux+SOM”,
and ”Emulated” correspond execution modes evaluated in
Table 2
taken for each of the trials; we used a laptop as the other endpoint
for the file transfers.
The x-axis shows the time taken by the transfer in seconds, and
the y-axis shows the cumulative fraction of transfers that completed
within a given time. Each CDF in Figure 5 is computed over 25 runs.
The download and upload performance shows that there is no
visible impact of interception and emulation on WiFi transfers,
despite an appreciable increase in execution time for individual
load and store instructions (as shown in Table 2). This is because
the WiFi driver and controller, like all modern bulk data transfer
devices, uses DMA to transfer packets. Once the controller firmware
is loaded, and the DMA tables configured, each packet transfer
(which can be many thousand bytes) requires very few (tens) MMIO
instructions to initiate the DMA. We believe this result indicates
that SeCloak can be used, even for high performance peripherals,
without significant impact on user-perceived performance.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described a system, SeCloak, that uses a
small-TCB kernel to allow users to unambiguously and verifiably
control peripherals on their mobile devices. Such a capability has
many uses, e.g., it can allow users to ensure they are not being
recorded, or journalists to ensure that they are not being tracked
by using radio or other means.
The main technical challenge in designing SeCloak was to en-
sure that existing mobile device software, in particular Android and
Linux, could co-exist with the secure kernel without code modifica-
tion and without affecting device stability and usability. Towards
this end, we have described an instruction emulation mechanism
that enables SeCloak without changing existing software using a
very small secure kernel.
SeCloak is a system that allows users to assert binary control
over peripheral availability. It is easy to imagine situations where
finer grained control is more appropriate, e.g., controlling the GPS
device to provide city-level location to specific apps, and true lo-
cation to others. In future work, we will extend our architecture
to support non-binary control over peripheral devices. In addition,
we plan to explore more cooperation between the two kernels for
MobiSys ’18, June 10–15, 2018, Munich, Germany Lentz et al.
enabling device power management operations and for improv-
ing performance by requiring strongly-ordered accesses only for
protected devices.
The source code for our implementation is publicly available at:
http://www.cs.umd.edu/projects/secureio
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